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This paper draws upon three texts from the trial section of the Corpus of 
English Dialogues, in order to explore the tactical impression management 
strategies used by Early Modern English courtroom participants 
(defendants, judges, lawyers and witnesses). I will demonstrate that 
modern impression management strategies (identified with other activity 
types in mind) are in evidence in the texts, as are additional courtroom-
specific strategies. I discuss the nuances of these impression management 
tactics, in light of (a) the obvious power differences between the 
participants involved, (b) the need to be perceived as credible in this legal 
setting, and (c) their convergence with particular types of face(work).   
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1. Introduction 
Impression management (henceforth IM) equates to the strategic management 
of behaviour (and, potentially, appearance) in order to influence the perceptions 
of others (Goffman 1959). It might be tactically defensive, thereby involving 
excuse-making, disclaimers, etc., or tactically assertive, thereby involving 
ingratiation, intimidation, self-promotion, etc. (Tedeshi and Melburg 1984). 
Such behaviour has been investigated in detail in modern settings: for example, 
employee-supervisor scenarios (Schlenker 1980; Eder and Fodor 2013), 
interview scenarios (Delery and Kacmar 1998; Ellis et al. 2002) and political 
scenarios (Sieber 2007). However, there are virtually no studies exploring IM 
tactics in historical settings to this author’s knowledge (see, e.g., Archer 2017). 
This paper thus draws upon the trial section of the Corpus of English Dialogues 
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(CED) to investigate IM, linguistically, in what was a highly conflictive setting. 
I begin by summarising the three trials I draw upon (section 2). I then go on to 
provide detailed accounts of defensive IM tactics (section 3.1), assertive IM 
tactics (section 3.2), and the trial participants’ use of these IM tactics in the 
historical courtroom (sections 4.1–4.3).  
One reason the CED trials are so useful, when it comes to IM-focused 
investigations, is that tactical IM is largely achieved using linguistic features that 
can be discerned from such records: in particular, lexical content, linguistic style 
and/or (non-)adherence to politeness and conversational rules (Holtgraves 
2013). A second motivating factor for using the CED trials is IM’s links with 
credibility and face(work) in such contexts. I will explore these convergences at 
various points in this paper (sections 3.1–5). Suffice it to say, credibility equates 
to a communicator’s believability (O’Keefe 2002: 181). Defendants in the 
historical courtroom had a compelling reason to be believed: staying alive.  In 
such situations, face maintenance thus equated to their maintaining “credibility 
in the eyes of others” (Gass and Seiter 2015: 90). Face, in this sense, relates to 
“a dynamically-negotiated image of self” (Archer 2017: X), that is, the line an 
individual claims based upon what others seem to be assuming about him/her 
(Goffman 1967: 5). Because it is shaped by interlocutors, in this way, it can be 
withdrawn as readily as it is given. Facework, then, relates to “the actions taken 
by a person to make what [s/]he is doing consistent with face” (Goffman, ibid.), 
from his/her perspective. This might involve face enhancement, as part of face 
maintenance, and/or deliberate face damage (especially given the conflictive 
setting).  
2. The CED Trials used in this study 
Rather than focusing on trial texts representative of the CED’s full 200-year 
period (1560–1760), this paper undertakes a detailed investigation of three 
extracts taken from the treason trials of Dr John Hewet (1658), Edward Coleman 
(1678) and Mrs Elizabeth Cellier (1680).  
 
 Hewet had been a chaplain to Charles I, prior to the King’s execution, and 
remained openly supportive of Charles’ exiled son following his death, with 
the result that he was brought to trial on treason charges (alongside Henry 
Slingsby and John Mordant). The three men refused to plead, and claimed 
the right to trial by jury. Mordant was acquitted on a technicality. Hewet and 
Slingsby were found guilty, and put to death.   
 Coleman was an English Catholic courtier, under Charles II. He was accused 
of being involved in a plot against the King. His relationship with the French 
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Court rendered Coleman vulnerable to the attack, even though this “Popish 
Plot” was pure fiction. Coleman was found guilty, and put to death.  
 Cellier (a midwife) acted as a charity-channel for many leading Catholic 
leaders of the period. This included providing charity from Lady Powis to 
Thomas Dangerfield, a man who went on to accuse her of being involved in 
the Meal-Tub plot against the future James II (and, in particular, of only 
helping him on condition that he assassinate the latter). Cellier was acquitted, 
however, when Dangerfield was found to lack credibility as a witness. 
Dangerfield was then arrested for an unrelated felony.  
 
Treason is a serious offence, which threatens the security of the state. During our 
period, the trials themselves and/or the resulting executions could therefore be 
heavily propagandist: the aim being to dissuade would-be dissidents or 
transgressors from continuing on a similar path. Defendants, in such cases, were 
often framed so that they lacked credibility “in the eyes of others” (cf. Gass and 
Seiter 2015: 90), regardless of whether they were innocent or guilty. 
Forthcoming discussions of credibility, or lack of, therefore relate to 
believability, namely, what others perceived to be (and thus accepted as) factual 
accuracy, or rejected as fabrication.  
3. Tactical IM strategies, and their links with face(work) 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 (following) outline defensive and assertive IM strategies 
(respectively), and also make clear how these IM strategies generally link to 
face(work). The applicability of specific IM tactics, and their convergence with 
particular types of face(work) in  the seventeenth century English courtroom, is 
then explored in detail in sections 4–5.    
3.1 An outline of defensive IM strategies 
Defensive IM is mainly associated with “corrective facework” (Guerrero et al. 
2010) or “remedial work” (Goffman 1971). Where the influence process is 
upwards – as in, for example, employee to supervisor interactions – common 
strategies include making excuses, providing justifications and/or offering 
“plausible” reasons (Schlenker 1980). As Ellis et al. (2002) note, these IM tactics 
enable an employee to save face, by limiting the loss of positive self-image to 
some extent and/or by bolstering (self-)image when they feel it under threat in 
some way. For instance, excuses provide the employee with a means of claiming 
no (personal) involvement in and/or responsibility for a negative outcome 
(DuBrin 2010), thereby helping them to maintain their positive self-face or 
“want” to be approved of (Brown and Levinson 1987). Justifications provide 
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employees (as well as others) with the means of accepting some responsibility 
for X, thereby triggering postive self-face issues. However, they also include a 
re-frame, which serves to diminish and even trivialise aspects that are 
particularly negative (Holland et al. 2002). They might invite 
superiors/significant others to consider X from a perspective that is (more) 
favourable to the justifier, for example (Guerrero et al. 2010: 44). They can also 
be used to re-frame a negative action as legitimate, because of serving a higher 
good (as when the ends are argued to justify the means). Justifications can be 
used by superiors (such as supervisors) too: in an attempt to “desensitize the 
employee to any forthcoming bad news” (Eder and Fodor 2013: 328), for 
example. Accounts that seek to explain or provide reasons for social 
transgressions (of the type, “What I meant was ....”) share some similiaries with 
justifications, but seem to be less self-serving. They are thus recognised to “have 
the potential to remediate social predicaments”, whilst nonetheless helping 
“individuals [to] present themselves in a more favourable light” (Graham and 
Taylor 2014: 105).  
In contrast to reasons and justifications, disclaimers are used in an 
attempt to disavow responsibility altogether: thereby protecting the individual’s 
postive self-image (in preference to any face needs of the other). Avoidance 
tactics also deny responsibility: usually, via distancing. This can include 
pretending X “never happened or otherwise ignor[ing] its occurrence” (Guerrero 
et al. 2010: 45). Another form of denial, which may be particularly pertinent to 
this study, is that of claiming one’s innocence, by denying involvement in the 
situation (Crane and Crane 2002).  
Our seventh IM strategy, apologies, has been discussed at length in the 
facework literature. In essence, they seek to restore the recipient’s negative face, 
following a transgression (Brown and Levinson 1987). However, the very 
acknowledgement that a transgression has taken place will impinge upon the 
apologizer’s own positive face (ibid: 187). That face damage can be intensified, 
further, if the apologizer’s actions are deemed insincere and/or are not accepted. 
This may explain why apologies can express an individual’s level of remorse or 
regret, without necessarily indicating responsibility for X and/or acknowledging 
the need for some sort of restitution/corrective action (DuBrin 2010). Schlenker 
and Weigold (1992: 162) maintain, nonetheless, that “admissions of 
responsibility ... for undesirable events” can have their own self-presentation 
benefits: for example, signalling a positive moral trait in line with an expected 
social or cultural norm. Apologies for misdeeds, which contain 
acknowledgements of responsibility, are also “more likely to evoke forgiveness 
(rather than anger) from the offended person than are individuals who deny 
wrongdoing” (Graham and Taylor 2014: 105). 
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Guerrero et al.  (2010) also categorise certain forms of aggression and 
humour as “corrective facework”. Humour serves “corrective” purposes when 
the aim is to “to show poise”, “come across as competent” or signal magnanimity 
by overlooking (small) FTAs, etc. (ibid: 45). Aggression – be it verbal and/or 
physical – is a (self) face-saving behaviour, when triggered by an individual’s 
perception that they have been intentionally attacked. Felton (2012) provides the 
example of aggressive outbursts as a response to slurs (and other negative 
framing devices). Aggression has a corrective facework function when also used 
in response to embarrassment and/or when triggered by perceptions of a norm 
violation (Guerrero et al. 2010).  
3.2 An outline of assertive IM strategies 
Humour and aggression can be used for assertive (as well as defensive) IM 
purposes. Both have been shown to be effective intimidation strategies, for 
example. Aggression is particularly effective in situations where fear is used in 
an attempt to control the actions of others: typical examples being bullying and 
making threats (Koslowsky and Pindek 2011: 284). Humour has proven to be an 
effective vehicle, in addition, “for conveying ambitions, subversions [and] 
triumphs” (Grugulis 2002: 287).  
 Unlike defensive IM strategies, assertive IM strategies tend to be 
promotional behaviours, be they negative (e.g., intimidation) or positive (e.g., 
boasting). Boasting is a form of self-promotion, whereby an individual promotes 
their own strengths/qualities/characteristics in order to accentuate or “prove” 
their competency. Individuals engage in a special type of boasting, 
exemplification, when they portray their moral worthiness. For example, they 
might emphasize their sincerity, or their responsibility towards/dedication to Y 
in ways that are “above and beyond the call of duty” (DuBrin 2010: 42). They 
might even “seiz[e] the high moral ground” in ways that call attention to their 
integrity (Sheridan 2016: 139). Other types of self-promotion include:  
 
 achievements, which involve an individual declaring their successful 
performance, when it comes to X, 
 entitlements, which involve them exaggerating responsibility for positive life 
experiences, and  
 enhancements, whereby an individual gives an event pronounced value or 
significance in order to boost its importance (Delery and Kacmar 1998).  
 
Supplication is the antithesis of self-promotion in that individuals present 
themselves as “needy”. They might emphasise their faults, limitations or pains, 
for example. Very often, the aim is to gain sympathy (DuBrin 2010: 42).  
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 Our final IM tactic is that of ingratiation. An individual engages in 
ingratiation in order to gain acceptance (through, e.g., getting people to like or 
need them). Many researchers have argued that ingratiation tends to occur when 
the individual has an ulterior motive and/or when the other has discretionary 
power, such that they can administer rewards/benefits and punishments/costs 
(see, e.g., Berscheld and Regan 2016). It therefore involves attempts to increase 
self’s personal attractiveness and/or other’s need for self’s skillsets, and 
sometimes self feigning attraction to other. Well-documented tactics include (i) 
opinion conformity, (ii) other face enhancement, and/or (iii) self-enhancement 
through selective self-presentation (Jones 1964). An individual achieves (i) 
when they voice opinions, beliefs or values that are thought to match the 
interlocutor’s (Ralston and Elsass 2013). (ii) equates to an individual praising or 
flattering their interlocutor(s), that is, engaging in other face-enhancement, in 
order to raise their self-esteem (Ellis et al. 2002). Examples of (iii) include an 
individual “advertis[ing] his or her strengths, virtues, and admirable qualities” 
in order to create “a positive public identity” suited to their purposes at that time 
(DeLamater et al. 2014: 154).  
4. IM Strategies in the CED Trial texts 
IM strategies, as outlined in sections 3.1 and 3.2, tend to be used when 
individuals want to create a certain image for themselves. Defensive IM 
strategies especially can be fraught with risk, however. An individual engaging 
in such strategies may do so as a means of saving face whilst portraying a more 
positive self-image, for example. If they are being defensive about work-related 
matters, they nonetheless risk appearing incompetent (Koslowsky and Pindek 
2011: 284). If their defensive strategies relate to alleged criminal activities, they 
risk even more (including appearing deceitful).  
4.1 Hewet, Lord President and Prideaux 
The following extract is taken from Hewet’s trial (alongside Mordant and 
Slingsby). 
 
(1)  
L. Presid. Dr. H. The Court hath had much patience in hearing of you thus long, 
you having not so much as owned their Authority; if you will not own 
us, we will own you; therefore I require the Clerk to enter it, that we 
have required you to plead. 
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Mr. Phelps Cl John Hewet, you here stand charged of High Treason against his 
Highness the Lord Protector, and the Common-wealth; the charge hath 
been read to you, the Court have demanded whether guilty or not 
guilty, they again demand of you whether guilty or not guilty.  
D. H. My Lord, I shall be very loth to do any thing to save my life, and 
forfeit a good conscience: And I shall not for my private interest give 
up the Privileges of those that are equal Freemen with my self: I am 
look'd upon in a double Capacity, as a Clergy man, and as a Common-
wealths-man; I should be very loth to be scandalous in either; And 
pray be pleased to do that justice to your selves as to vindicate the 
legality of your Judicature, and then I'le proceed.  
Mr. At. G.  My Lord, you was pleased to tell the Doctor, that you will own him 
when he doth not own you, but, my Lord, his flying in your faces, and 
taxing you this is not to be endured; I wish he would have that 
consideration of himself, that if he doth not own your Authority, you 
expect to be owned, and by it he will be supposed to be guilty of all 
those Crimes that are laid to his charge, and by not pleading he doth 
confess them; that will be a high scandal to Mr. Doctor; Therefore to 
vindicate your self, I desire you to answer. 
Dr. H.  This learned Gent. hath urged it with a great deal of civility and 
respect to me, which I must own and thankfully acknowledge; but (my 
Lord) withal, I dare not for the saving of my self give up others, so 
many thousands of others, by my Precedent, that might likewise be 
involved in the same condition that I am in; therefore (my Lord) let it 
appear that it is a lawful Judicature, and I have done. 
Mr. At. G.        I beseech Mr. Doctor to consider his case, he is not brought as a  
                        Champion for the people of England, as he stands charged he  
                        appears to you to be contrary affected; I humbly beg that he 
                       would be pleased to plead, that so his innocency may be clear'd. 
Dr. H.  My Lord, I said before that I am no Lawyer, I  understand nothing of  
it, neither desire to be Judge in my own cause; but I do not desire 
likewise to be judged by every person that would sit to judge me, 
neither would I give up that right that belongs to an English man to 
every one that demands it, therefore I desire you to grant this Petition, 
that you will make appear that you are a lawful Judicature. I would 
rather die ten thousand times then I will be guilty of giving up my 
fellow-freemens liberties and priviledges. 
(Trial of Slingsby, Hewet and Mordant, 1658) 
 
The Lord President initially used an exemplification tactic, in the first turn of 
this extract, to signal that the Court had gone “above and beyond” in their 
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responsibility towards Hewet. Notice, however, that it was a preamble to a 
complaint: that the patience shown in hearing Hewet this long had not been 
reciprocated by him (in the form of Hewet entering a plea). Hewet’s having not 
so much as owned their Authority can thus be understood as a perceived face 
threat to both the Court’s “want” to be recognised as an Authority (cf. positive 
face) and their “want” to be free to act, in accordance with that Authority (cf. 
negative face). The Lord President used an intimidation tactic at this point: if 
you will not own us, we will own you. The conditional clause alluded to the 
Court’s weariness in respect to the enforced delay (because of no plea being 
entered). Two requires (Archer 2005) followed. They were designed to make 
explicit the Court’s right to impose its will upon Hewet,1 but they also served to 
underscore the ongoing power struggle between Hewet and the Court.  
Instead of entering a plea to the charge of High Treason, as required, 
Hewet attempted to “seiz[e] the high moral ground” (Sheridan 2016: 130) by (i) 
exemplifying himself as a defender of the rights of Freemen, and (ii) 
emphasising the importance of maintaining a good conscience (given his Clergy 
man and Common-wealths-man status). Although Hewet lacked the institutional 
power to do so, he then directed his own require to the Court: pray be pleased 
to…vindicate the legality of your Judicature (cf. Archer 2005). If Hewet was 
claiming he was not responsible for the impasse, as a way of showing himself in 
a more favourable light, it was fraught with risk (cf. excuses and justifications, 
discussed in 3.1). For any reframe legitimating Hewet’s own actions rendered 
the Court’s actions unlawful (in some way), thereby offending their professional 
face (Charles 1996).   
The Attorney General, Edmund Prideaux, was the next person to speak. 
His address to the Court amounted to a third-person criticism of the Doctor, for 
his obstinacy (in flying in the faces of the Court). His tactics included (i) 
reiterating the Lord President’s conditional warning that, if Hewet did not own 
their Authority, the Court would expect to be owned, and (ii) making clear that 
by not pleading, Hewet was effectively confessing to the Crimes that were laid 
to his charge. Prideaux then went on to direct a second-person desire to Hewet 
that he answer. As Archer (2005: 339) notes, desires function like requests, but 
also “have a strength of feeling” indicative of “strong intention or aim”. Hewet 
seemed to appreciate Prideaux’s apparent concern for him, for his initial 
response was to engage in other face enhancement (i.e., a form of 
ingratiation). His acknowledgement of Prideaux’ civil treatment of him up to 
this point was not followed by opinion conformity (as we might expect, given 
                                                     
1 Requires presuppose that the Speaker (S) and the Hearer (H) are in an asymmetrical 
relationship, and thus that S has sufficient authority to cause H to do what S expects (see 
Archer 2005: 270, 339). 
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his predicament), however. Instead, Hewet used the self-promotion tactic of 
enhancement as a means of giving his own court case pronounced value or 
significance. The aim was to boost its importance (Delery and Kacmar 1998): 
hence his (re-)assertion to be forgoing his own safety on behalf of so many 
thousands of others. 
Individuals seek “to control how others perceive them” in (most) modern 
settings so that they might minimise punishments and maximise rewards (Leary 
and Kowalski 1990: 37). This was not true of Hewet. Instead, he constructed a 
public image that sought to render him Champion for the people of England (to 
use the Attorney General’s words). Prideaux’ purpose in assigning this image to 
Hewet was so that he might explicitly reject any notion that Hewet was brought 
to the Court in order to speak for freemen as a whole, of course. Prideaux was 
nonetheless prepared to once again implore Hewet to be “owned” by the Court, 
so his innocency may be clear'd. In response, Hewet drew (once more) upon 
enhancement and exemplification tactics to reiterate his criticism of the Court 
for acting beyond their remit, and to re-emphasise his cause was more important 
than his life. In fact, he framed himself as someone who would die ten thousand 
times before giving up [his] fellow-freemens liberties and priviledges. Hewet 
was executed on Tower Hill, near to the Tower of London, shortly thereafter. 
4.2 Coleman and Scroggs 
Extract (2) comes from Edward Coleman’s trial. 
 
(2)  
Pris.  I hope my Lord if there be any Point of Law, that I am not skill'd in, that your  
Lordship will be pleased not to take the advantage over me. Another thing  
seems most dreadful, that is, the  violent prejudices that seem to be against  
every man in England, that is confess'd to be a Roman Catholick. It is possible  
that a Roman Catholick may be very innocent of these crimes. If one of those  
Innocent Roman Catholicks should come to this Bar, he lies under such  
disadvantages already, and his Prejudices so greatly byasseth humane Nature,  
that unless your Lordship will lean extremely much on the other side, Justice  
will hardly stand upright, and lie upon a Level. But to satisfie your Lordship, I 
do not think it any service to destroy any of the Kings Subjects, unless it be in 
a very plain case. 
L.C.J. You need not make any preparations for us in this matter, you shall have a 
fair, just, and legal Trial; if Condemned, it will be apparent you ought to be so; 
and without a fair Proof, there shall be no Condemnation. Therefore you shall  
find, we will not do to you, as you do to us, blow up at adventure, kill people  
because they are not of your perswasion; our Religion teacheth us another  
Doctrine, and you shall find it clearly to your advantage. We seek no mans  
blood, but our own safety. But you are brought here from the necessity of  
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things, which your selves have made; and from your own actions you shall be  
condemned, or acquitted. 
Pris. It is supposed upon Evidence, that the Examinations that have been of me in 
Prison, are like to be Evidence against me now; I have nothing to say against it: 
But give me leave to say at this time, that when I was in Prison, I was upon my 
ingenuity charged; I promised I would confess all I knew. And I onely say this, 
That what I said in Prison is true, and am ready at any time to Swear and 
Evidence, that that is all the truth. 
L.C.J.   It is all true that you say: but did you tell all that vvas true? 
Pris.  I know no more, than what I declared to the Two Houses. 
L.C.J.   Mr. Coleman, I'll tell you when you will be apt to gain credit in this matter:  
             You say, that you told all things that you knew, the Truth, and the whole  
             Truth. Can Mankind be persuaded, that you, that had this Negotiation in 74.  
             and 75. left off just then, at that time vvhen your Letters vvere found  
             according to their Dates? Do you believe, there vvas no Negotiation after 75.  
             because vve have not found them? Have you spoke one vvord to that? Have  
             you confessed, or produced those Papers and Weekly Intelligence? When you  
             ansvver that, you may have credit; vvithout that, it is impossible: For I cannot  
             give credit to one vvord you say, unless you give an account of the subsequent  
             Negotiation. 
(Treason Trial of Edward Coleman, 1678) 
 
At first glance, Coleman’s admittance of a weakness (i.e., a lack of skill), 
followed by his hope to the Court (that he be helped in any Point of Law, rather 
than taken advantage of) could be taken to be an example of the defensive tactic 
of supplication (Leary 1996). When such supplication strategies are used today, 
they are generally understood to signal (a level of) submissiveness on the part of 
the speaker (Conolly-Ahern and Herrerro 2008: 59). This is not true of Coleman: 
he went on to articulate a dreadful observation, in the very same turn, respecting 
the violent prejudices that seem to be against everyman in England, 
that...confess’d to be a Roman Catholick. This face-attacking accusation served 
as a premise for also claiming that Roman Catholics were under the 
disadvantage of being believed guilty even when they were innocent, and thus 
that Justice would hardly stand upright (i.e., prevail) for them. Coleman’s third-
person exemplification of the morality of innocent Roman Catholics thus 
equated to an indirect form of self-defence. That is to say, Coleman was aligning 
himself with – so that he might be recognised as – one of the (worthy) innocents 
outdone by religious prejudice. This fits with what we know in respect to the 
Popish Plot being fictitious, having been made up by Coleman’s main accuser 
(Titus Oates), and with the English justice system having “a ROMAN-CATHOLIC-
EQUALLED-TRAITOR reality paradigm” (Archer 2014: 5) at this time.  
The belief that Roman Catholics were always guilty was not immediately 
evident in the Lord Chief Justice’s response. Indeed, Scroggs first assured 
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Coleman that he would have a fair, just and legal Trial. This potentially face-
saving clarification was quickly followed by an intimidation tactic, however. 
Simply put, Scroggs made clear (to Coleman) the consequences he would face 
if he were to push too far (cf. DuBrin 2010: 43). The intimidation was veiled 
somewhat in exemplification though, so that the Court was presented as acting 
with integrity, and in accordance with a higher morality occasioned by the 
Court’s own Religious perswasion (cf. Sheridan, 2016: 139). It was this higher 
morality that was meant to assure Coleman the Court would not do to him what 
his kind had done to their kind, namely, blow up at adventure, and kill people 
because they were of a diferent perswasion. Scroggs’ representational frame 
(Locher and Watts 2008) effectively attributed negative moral traits (Harré and 
Moghaddam 2003: 6) to both Coleman and Roman Catholocism, thereby 
creating credibility issues for both.  
 Coleman engaged in self-promotion at this point, as a means of 
emphasizing he was speaking the truth, and knew no more. Hence his 
explanation that he had promised he would confess all he knew, when in Prison, 
and that he had done so: thereby presenting himself as a man of his word. 
Scroggs’ assessment – It is all true that you say: but did you tell all that vvas 
true? – insinuated that Coleman was only admitting to what the Court had 
already established previously (namely, that he had had some correspondence 
with the French). In so doing, Scroggs was effectively countering Coleman’s 
self-presentation as “truthful” with an opposing other-presentation of 
Coleman as only being prepared to admit to what was already known. This 
therefore provides us with evidence of the guilt bias mentioned above, as does 
the remaining adjacency pair between the two. Coleman stated that he knew no 
more than he had already declared to the Two Houses. Scroggs appeared to hear 
this as a violation of the Quality and Quantity maxims (Grice, 1975). Hence his 
query to Coleman as to whether he had told the whole Truth and his summary 
(following a series of pointed questions) that he would not be able to give credit 
to one vvord that Coleman had said, unless he give him an account of ... 
Negotiations, which had followed the Negotiation in 74. In spite of Coleman’s 
insistence there was no more to tell (beyond that already established by the 
Court, through the correspondence they found), Scroggs stuck to his belief that 
Coleman was able to confess to more, but was unwilling to do so. Coleman was 
thus found guilty, and was hanged, drawn and quartered on 3rd December 1678. 
He maintained his innocence until the very end. 
4.3 Dangerfield, Scroggs and Cellier 
Extract (3) involves the same Lord Chief Justice as above – Scroggs. On this 
occasion, we are exploring his questioning of Thomas Dangerfield: the man 
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whose evidence led to Cellier being indicted for “intend[ing] the killing, death, 
and final destruction of...the King” (Greene 2011: 90). Earlier in her trial, Cellier 
had sought to convince Scroggs that Dangerfield could not act as a witness 
against her because of being a convicted felon. When Scroggs explained he had 
been pardoned (presumably because of providing evidence against her), she 
continued to argue “Dangerfield was not a lawful witness because the wording 
of his royal pardon” (Loveman 2006: 115) did not extend to all of the crimes for 
which he was convicted. Dangerfield’s response to Cellier’s claims, when asked, 
was to state he would take it at her Proof. Cellier went on to present “the records 
of Dangerfield’s convictions adding that, to save time, she had brought ‘but 
Thirteen’ of them” (ibid, author’s emphasis).  Dangerfield was ordered to 
produce a copy of his pardon and, on doing so some thirty minutes later, it was 
found that it had indeed “omitted the Latin phrase, pro Felloniis, for fellonies, 
which Omission had made the Pardon defective” (Greene 2011: 91). At this 
point, Scroggs addressed both Dangerfield and also the Court more widely. 
 
(3) 
L.C.J.  Such Fellows as you are, Sirrah, shall know we are not afraid of you. 
He produces us here a Pardon by the Name of Thomas Dangerfield of Waltham,  
and says, his Father and Kinsman are both of that Name and Place. VVill you  
have him Sworn whether his Father or Cozen Thomas was ever convicted of 
Felony. It is notorious enough what a Fellow this is, he was in Chelmsford Gaol. 
I will shake all such Fellows before I have done with them. 
Have you any more to say?  
Are there any Waltham Men here? 
Dan.  My Lord, this is enough to discourage a man from ever entring into an honest 
Principle. 
L.C.J.  What? Do you with all the mischief that Hell hath in you think to brave it in a 
Court of Justice? I wonder at your Impudence, that you dare look a Court of 
Justice in the Face, after having been made appear so notorious a Villain. 
Jones.  Indeed, if he be the same Man, he is not fit for a Witness. 
L.C.J.  And that he is the same Man is very notorious. 
 Come Mrs. Celliers, What have you more to say? 
Mrs. C. Enough, my Lord. 
L.C.J. You have said enough already. 
Come Gentlemen of the Jury, this is a plain Case, here is but one Witness in a 
Case of Treason, and that not direct, therefore lay your heads together. 
(Treason Trial of Elizabeth Cellier, 1680) 
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Scroggs’ initial address to Dangerfield contained an expression of contempt: 
sirrah.2 It was part of a depiction of Dangerfield, which framed him as 
intimidator, thereby seemingly justifying the intimidation that Dangerfield 
would soon know (given the Court were not afraid of...such Fellows). Scroggs’ 
deprecation of Dangerfield remained evident as he went on to address the Court. 
He described him as a notorious…Fellow who had frequented Chelmsford Gaol, 
for example, and once again drew upon intimidation tactics, in promising he 
would shake…such Fellows as him before he was done.  
Dangerfield was then addressed directly once again by Scroggs. His 
question, Have you any more to say, provided the witness with a much-needed 
opportunity to engage in some form of image restoration. Dangerfield opted to 
flout the Relevance maxim (Grice 1975) to implicate that the Court was 
hampering his attempts to reform. The deflection tactic was ill thought-through, 
in credibility terms, as Dangerfield effectively aligned himself with criminality, 
via his use of ever entering into an honest Principle. The face damage it inflicted 
on the Court also infuriated Scroggs, who engaged in what we might label image 
obliteration at this point (contra Benoit 1997). His tirade emphasized 
Dangerfield’s depravity (given all the mischief of Hell in him), Impudence (in 
braving it in a Court of Justice / daring to look a Court of Justice in the Face), 
and villainous notoriety. The tirade led Jones to query Dangerfield’s reliability 
as a witness. In response, Scroggs again emphasized Dangerfield’s notoriety, 
before asking the defendant if she had more to say. Cellier flouted the Quantity 
maxim (Grice 1975) to implicate she could say much more. Scroggs seemed to 
have heard enough though. He signalled to the Jury that this was a plain Case, 
with one possible outcome only, following which Cellier was acquitted, and 
Dangerfield was arraigned. 
5. IM and facework in the historical courtroom: a summary 
The IM literature focuses upon both assertive and defensive tactics when 
explaining the use of IM in modern contexts (Schlenker 1980; Tedeshi and 
Melburg 1984; Delery and Kacmar 1998; Ellis et al. 2002; Sieber 2007; Eder 
and Fodor 2013). Some of these IM tactics have been shown to be evident in the 
three CED trial extracts discussed in sections 4.1–4.3. The three Judges used 
intimidation in order to control the actions of the defendants or the witness, for 
example (cf. Koslowsky and Pindek 2011: 284). They may have resorted to such 
verbal aggression in response to a perceived threat to their own professional 
identity (cf. Charles 1996) and/or as a means of (re)building an external 
                                                     
2 Although sirrah is thought to have been popular with the infamous Jeffries (see, e.g., Kryk-
Kastovsky 2010), it was not regularly used in the CED trials as a whole. 
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impression of strength. Such “face-saving concerns” were likely to have been 
heightened for them, moreover, because of “the presence of an audience” 
(Donahue and Cai 2014: 31) in what were treason and, hence, propagandist trials 
(see section 2).  
The IM literature relating to modern contexts suggests that those who 
lack power will tend to engage in more IM than those with power: in particular, 
ingratiation (see, e.g., Schlenker 1980). This is because ingratiation provides 
a means of gaining acceptance from (as a means of influencing) those who 
administer rewards/benefits and punishments/costs (Berscheld and Regan 2016).  
One of our defendants, Hewet, engaged in a form of ingratiation (specifically, 
other face enhancement) to acknowledge the Attorney General’s civil 
treatment of him, for example. However, this particular IM tactic was not 
followed by opinion conformity, as we might expect. Instead, Hewet promoted 
a Champion of Freemen image, via exemplification (see 4.1). We might explain 
this, then, as a conflict between the Court’s instrumental goal (i.e., getting Hewet 
to plead) and Hewet’s self-presentational goal (i.e., fulfilling a higher purpose).  
Coleman also used an IM tactic associated with those of lower power: 
supplication. As highlighted in section 4.2, the characteristic submissiveness, 
which tends to typify supplication in modern contexts, was lacking beyond his 
initial admittance of a lack of legal skill. As before, conflicting goals help us to 
account for this. Coleman had a self-presentation goal that was in direct 
opposition with the other-presentation assigned to him by the Judge, William 
Scroggs. This was because of the latter’s guilt bias, which meant that Coleman 
was judged to be lying about his innocence (Archer 2014) in spite of his 
(increasingly desperate) attempts to convince the Court otherwise. Like Hewet, 
Coleman opted to use exemplification: in his case, to underscore the dreadful… 
disadvantages faced by Roman Catholics at this time. Like Hewet, the 
exemplification tactic proved unsuccessful. Scroggs was ultimately prepared to 
accept Cellier’s innocence, of course (see 4.3), but only once Dangerfield had 
been shown to be an unreliable witness (due to his criminal activities).  
My mention of perceived guilt or innocence provides us with two timely 
reminders with which to close. First, that facework was sometimes undertaken 
strategically for self-presentation and impression management purposes in the 
courtrooms of time past, as sections 4.1–4.3 reveal. Second, that there is a close 
relationship between IM, face(work) and credibility in such settings.  In the 
Introduction, I explained that being credible “in the eyes of others” (Gass and 
Seiter 2015: 90) and maintaining one’s face accordingly was crucial for 
defendants in particular. This explains the great efforts they would take to try to 
convince their Judges they were telling the truth (see 4.1, 4.2, and Archer 2005). 
As section 4.3 reveals, credibility could also become an issue for witnesses, 
when their “dynamically-negotiated image of self” (Archer 2017: X) was 
Impression management in the EModE courtroom  15 
deemed inappropriate and/or they did not do enough to restore a damaged image 
(Goffman 1967: 5).  
Archer’s (2005, 2014) work suggests that witnesses who sought to 
restore their image, once it had been damaged, could attack the face of those 
whose power was similar to their own. They needed to avoid any actions that 
might cause undue face damage to the Judges (or the Courts they represented), 
however, not least because being deemed disreputable or even aggressive 
seemed to trigger recurrent (and cumulative) face attack. The “face obliteration 
tactics” which ensue (as I have labelled them) have not been studied in any depth 
to date – in either historical or modern contexts. One reason for studying them, 
in the historical courtroom, would be to illuminate the relationship between IM 
and impoliteness in this legal setting: and how this affected credibility. 
Researchers might then determine whether face obliteration tactics occur in other 
conflictive settings too (modern and historical) and, if so, the extent to which 
they are shaped by and thus specific to the particular context and/or time period.   
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